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Military Control Over War News:
The Implications of the Persian Gulf
Stephen Cooper1
News coverage of warfare poses a difficult problem for political systems with a free press, such as
ours in the United States. In an era of high-tech weaponry and nearly instantaneous global communications, conflicts are inevitable between the obligation of the press to inform the general
public, and the obligation of the military to successfully conduct war. The military’s controls over
newsgathering during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War set off a controversy still smoldering during the
Haiti occupation of 1994. This paper examines the legal, historical, and technological aspects of this
issue.

Introduction
The United States government’s decision to control newsgathering during the 1990-91
Persian Gulf War sparked a lively debate in legal, journalistic, and academic circles. During this
war, journalists were denied free access to the theater of operations during deployment and
combat, and were restricted by a system of military escorts, pooled coverage, and military review
of copy. Although similar restrictions were in place during the military operations in Grenada
and Panama, the Persian Gulf War prompted the most serious challenges to the press restrictions,
including lawsuits contesting their constitutionality. At issue are the legality and social desirability of the restrictions, in a media system with libertarian and neoliberal underpinnings (Helle,
1995).
From a legal perspective this question involves the First Amendment. Critical positions hold
that the access restrictions constituted a de facto prior restraint of the press, and thus violated the
First Amendment. Supportive positions point to legal precedents allowing government control of
information on grounds of national security, and making a legal distinction between the
protections afforded publishing and the protections afforded newsgathering.
The social dimensions of this question concern the functions of the press in a democratic
society. Objections to the restrictions turn largely on the idea that the press serves an essential
function as the watchdog of government actions. Careful scrutiny of military operations is
critical, in this view, to the informed consent or disapproval of the American citizenry; press
restrictions thus damage the political process by impeding the timely and accurate flow of
information to the public.
The principal lawsuit filed during the Gulf War, Nation Magazine v. United States
Department of Defense (1991) proved inconclusive in settling the issue of constitutionality.
Since that time the Clinton administration has chosen in Somalia not to appreciably restrict the
press, but in Haiti £0 prepare controls similar to those of the Gulf War. Arguably the news
reports from Somalia, especially the picture coverage of the treatment of U.S. casualties and a
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prisoner of war, pressured the president to redefine the U.S. mission there. The Somalian and
Haitian situations thus provide a postscript to the Persian Gulf, regarding news coverage of postCold War military operations. Technological developments in newsgathering and broadcasting,
particularly live satellite transmission from the battlefront, have heightened the urgency of this
issue.
This paper will explore the legal and institutional dimensions of the government controls over
the press during the Persian Gulf War. It will argue that the controls were not a violation of the
First Amendment, but rather a necessary restructuring of the ongoing relationship between the
military and the press, driven by developments in electronic communications.
The Legal Battle Over the Gulf War Press Restrictions
Serious questions were raised about the legality of the press restrictions in place during the
Gulf War. Media outlets, interest groups, and journalists joined in lawsuits brought against the
Department of Defense during the combat operations, charging the government with violating
the First and Fifth Amendments (*1). Since the end of the war, a number of law journal articles
have appeared, many of which judged the press restrictions to have been unconstitutional and
argued forcefully that the military should never again be allowed to control the press to
the degree it did in the Persian Gulf War.
Three lawsuits in all were filed challenging the constitutionality of the press restrictions. Two
suits concerning access to the war zone in Kuwait were combined and heard in the United States
District Court in New York, as Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept. of Defense (1991). A third suit,
concerning the military’s refusal to allow picture coverage of casualties being returned to Dover
Air Force Base in Delaware, was heard in the federal district court in Washington (JB Pictures,
Inc. v. United States Department of Defense, 1991). In both trials the plaintiffs’ requests for
injunctive and declarative relief were denied (*2). Of the two, Nation raises the issues most
significant to this discussion. Does the press have, as the plaintiffs claimed, “a First Amendment
right to unlimited access to a foreign arena in which American military forces are engaged”
(Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 1561)?
What Nation Did, and Did Not, Settle
There were two fundamental questions in the Nation suit: do courts have jurisdiction over the
military’s control of the press, and if so, were the Gulf War restrictions constitutional? Whether a
court could even entertain a challenge to the military hinged on three points: whether the
plaintiffs had standing to file the complaint, whether it was a political question rather than a
judicial question, and whether the issue had become moot.
The first task of the plaintiffs was to establish that the suit represented a complaint capable of
judicial resolution, and that the plaintiffs had in fact suffered injury because of the defendants’
actions. That the court, if it chose, could resolve the issue by striking down the press guidelines
was clear. The plaintiffs claimed damage to their First Amendment rights to publish and Fifth
Amendment guarantee of due process. The court found the plaintiffs to have standing to file
the suit (Nation Magazine, pp. 1559 and 1561).
The second point concerned whether the issue was actually a political question disguised as a
judicial matter. While noting that civilian courts have long been reluctant to intrude into military
affairs, the Nation court observed that in this case the plaintiffs were not challenging “this

country’s military establishment, its goals, directives or tactics” (Nation Magazine, 1991, p.
1567) but rather objecting to the controls on newsgathering. Accordingly, the court determined
this case to be a judicial question.
The press restrictions had been lifted by the time this case was heard, and the final point was
whether the complaint had been rendered moot. Although an earlier case against the press
restrictions in Grenada had been thrown out on this ground (Flynt v. Weinberger, 1984;
Kenealey, 1992, p. 295), the Nation court observed that the question was likely to arise again in
the next war. An exception to the mootness principle occurs when the injury is too short in
duration to be litigated before it stops, but may occur again; that is, the action is “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” (Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 1568). The court found that even
though the provocation for the suit had been removed, the issue itself was not moot.
Having heard the case, the court denied the requests for injunctive and declarative relief. The
decision was handed down after the cessation of hostilities and the lifting of the press restrictions; an injunction was pointless by then. The decision noted that an issue such as this was likely
to arise in a future conflict, which would suggest declarative relief. Nonetheless the court refused
to rule on the constitutionality of the particular restrictions used in the Gulf War, seeming to
defer to future action by the Supreme Court (see Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 1560). While the
decision was not satisfactory to those advocating an absolute right of press access, Nation did
establish precedent for judicial review of military controls on the press. Yes, the media could
raise legal challenges to access restrictions and have their day in court.
But Which Supreme Court Doctrine Should Apply To Wartime?
Three doctrines exist which might be applied to press coverage of war: prior restraint, public
forum, and right of access to information. Despite some legal commentators’ enthusiasm for
applying it to the Gulf War restrictions (e.g., Boydston, 1992 & Smith, J. E., 1993) the Supreme
Court doctrine of prior restraint, if carefully considered, is not the proper framework. Prior
restraint, prohibiting the publication of information in the possession of the press, bears a
heavy burden of proof. While the cases of Schenck v. U.S. ( 1919) and Near v. Minnesota ( 1931)
had recognized national security interests as justification for prior restraint, the “Pentagon
Papers” case, known formally as New York Times Co. v. U.S. (1971), established how difficult it
would be for the government to make such an argument. There is very little possibility, if the
press restrictions were indeed a case of prior restraint, that they would be upheld. The critical
point here, however, is that information gathering, not publication, was the issue in the Gulf
War. The doctrine of prior restraint, while convenient for opponents of the press restrictions, is
not appropriate to considering a question of access to information.
Another possibility is the doctrine of the public forum. If the news process is considered to be
expressive activity is the military barred from restricting the press activities? The public forum
cases protect against government interference in places traditionally open to the public for debate
and expression (Smolla, 1992, p. 208-211). By contrast, “the Supreme Court has expressly ruled
that military bases are not public fora” (Kenealey, 1992, p. 303). Again, arguing against the
Gulf War restrictions on this basis misapplies “a doctrine designed to protect expressive
activities to activities that involve the gathering of information” (Cassell, 1985, p. 951).
The doctrines of prior restraint and public forum are tangential to the question at hand. Recent
Supreme Court decisions have begun to delineate a limited right of access to information, and it
is in this context that the Gulf War restrictions should be considered.

The Supreme Court, the Press, and a Limited Right of Access
The First Amendment guarantees freedoms of speech and publishing. The “Pentagon Papers”
case was a ringing endorsement of the freedom to publish, even when the material was obtained
illegally. By contrast, a right of the press to acquire information is not so clear cut.
In contrast to the well-established doctrine that prior restraints are
presumptively invalid in all but the most extreme circumstances, the right of
journalistic access to news, or to places where news is found, is one that the Supreme
Court has never even recognized. In fact, many cases expressly state that no such
constitutional right exists, except as a figment of publishers’ imaginations (Jacobs, 1992,
p. 678).
In particular, there has been no decision on the rights of the press to obtain information on a
military operation (Olson, 1992, p. 525). There are a number of decisions granting the press
access to government information in nonmilitary situations, but these in fact are quite specific in
their application despite much advocacy for a broader right comparable to that of free speech
(e.g., Kenealey, 1992, p. 311 & Smith, J. E., 1993, p. 338).
Ironically enough the language suggesting a right of access first appeared in a case in which
the Supreme Court denied reporters’ First Amendment claims. In Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) the
Court rejected journalists’ arguments that the guarantee of a free press implied a right to
withhold the names of their confidential sources from a grand jury. While noting that “newsmen
have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is
excluded” (Branzburg, 1972, p.p. 684-685), the decision was nonetheless careful to rein in the
inference that might have been drawn: “Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify
for First Amendment protection: without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated.” (Branzburg, 1972, p. 681). As cautious and limited as the
reference may seem, this passage is the source of later assertions that a right of access exists.
The Court directly took up the question of a putative right of access two years later in Pell v.
Procunier (1974) and Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co. (1974). Bothe cases dealt with
reporters’ demands to conduct interviews with prison inmates, requests which had been denied
by state and federal prison authorities. In both cases the embryonic right of access fared badly:
the Court determined that no violation of the First Amendment had in fact occurred. The decision
in Pell, written by Justice Potter Stewart (Pell v. Procunier, 1974), makes a sharp distinction
between the press’ freedom to try to obtain information and a government obligation to provide
sources.
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information
Not available to members of the general public….It is quite another thing to
suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to
make available to journalists sources of information not available to members
of the public generally (p. 834).
While the press had no luck in getting access to restricted areas of prisons (Pell v. Procunier,
1974; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 1974; Houchins v. KQED, 1978), it fared much better with

regard to criminal trials. Two cases, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) and Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk (1981) established that government
restrictions on access to trials must satisfy a stringent three-part test.
In Richmond Newspapers the Court found that the press indeed had a right to attend criminal
trials, just as the public did. The decision, written by Chief Justice Burger, noted that “a presumption of openness adheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice”
(Richmond Newspapers, 1980, p. 573). A separate concurrence by Justice Stevens broadened the
scope considerably: “the First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of
their rights of access to information about the operation of their government” (Richmond
Newspapers, 1980, p. 584). Justice Brennan in his separate concurrence supported “the special
nature of a claim of First Amendment right to gather information” (Richmond Newspapers, 1980,
p. 586) (*3).
Details of how the government would have to justify restricting access were forthcoming in
Globe Newspaper (1981). The Court struck down a Massachusetts law excluding the press from
trials of sex crimes involving minors, again affirming that trials were presumptively open to the
public, and that the press performed a valuable service in bringing information to the public.
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion delineated three points on which the question of press access
turned: “the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public” (Globe
Newspaper, 1981, p. 605); “the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole” (Globe Newspaper, 1981, p. 606); denial of access must be “necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and…narrowly tailored to serve that interest” (Globe Newspaper, 1981, p. 607).
Not all justices shared Justice Brennan’s apparent enthusiasm for looking at the big picture.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s separate concurrence in Globe specifically disclaimed any
broader applicability of the decision: “I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court’s
decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials” (Globe Newspaper, 1981, p. 611). The dissent of Justices Burger and Rehnquist criticized the majority
opinion’s “expansive interpretation” (Globe Newspaper, 1981, p. 613).
Given the ambiguity whether the Globe decision should extend to press coverage of war, it is
not surprising that the Nation court was so reluctant to apply it to the Gulf War restrictions.
Nonetheless, legal scholars, eager for a broad statement of principle, have looked to Globe to
provide guidance, variously arguing that Globe supports both positions on the constitutionality of
the restrictions (for example, Boydston 1992, p. 1098; Cassell, 1985, pp. 958-959; Kenealey,
1992, p. 309; Smith, J. E., 1993, pp. 309-311). Both sides seem ready to accept the applicability
of Globe to the Gulf War access restrictions, and argue the specifics.
The three conditions of the Globe decision can be generalized in this way:
First, a claimant [of access] must show that the place ‘historically had been
open to the press and general public.’ Second, the right of access must ‘play
a particularly significant role’ in the functioning of the process in question and
of the government as a whole. Finally, if these two elements have been
satisfied, access may be denied if the government establishes that ‘the denial
is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest’ (Cassell, 1985, pp. 958-959).

If the assumption is made that the Globe test is applicable to situations beyond criminal trials,
as lower courts have subsequently clone (Kenealey, 1992, pp. 309-311), the question becomes
whether the Gulf War combat theater was exempt from press access under the terms outlined
above. The first prong of the Globe test requires an examination of how war has traditionally
been covered by the American press.
The Historical Context: A Brief Look At American War Reportage
Reportage of early conflicts in America’s history was both unrestricted and haphazard, with
much of the press’ information coming from soldiers’ correspondence (Kenealey, 1992, pp. 312313). Prior to the Civil War, reports from the battlefront were so slow to arrive that there were
few concerns about their threat to military security (Jacobs, 1992, p. 679; Olson, 1992, p. 514).
With the introduction of the telegraph and the professionalization of the press in the first half of
the nineteenth century, the situation changed dramatically. Both postpublication sanctions and
access restrictions were common during the Civil War in the North and the South. Government
control of the press extended even to the extreme of shutting down newspapers (Boydston, 1992,
pp. 1076-1077; Jacobs, 1992, p. 680).
Press restrictions during the Spanish-American War also seem harsh by present-day expectations. “Censors were stationed at key telegraph offices to monitor incoming dispatches, although
reporters remained free to roam the battlefield” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 680). The timeliness of telegraphed dispatches created a new strategic value in the information; the government response
was to control the content of the dispatches at the point of a technological bottleneck.
Similar restrictions continued during World War I. While they could travel freely in the
theater of operations of the American Expeditionary Force, American reporters were required to
obtain accreditation, one condition of which was that “[t]he newspaper representative was to
submit all correspondence, except personal letters, to the press officer or his assistant…and, the
correspondent agreed to accept the press officer’s instructions as to further censorship rules from
time to time” (Boydston, 1992, p. 1078)(*4). During this time the Supreme Court upheld a
number of convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917, which prohibited certain antiwar
expressions. While most cases concerned speakers and pamphleteers (Franklin, 1987, p. 47;
Hixson, 1989, pp. 288-298), the editors of two German-language newspapers were held to have
violated the Espionage Act by publishing material disparaging the American military (Schaefer
v. U.S., 1920). This war saw two innovations in shaping the war coverage: “the public information specialist and a bureau to issue war reports” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 681).
Press pools were widely used for the first time in World War II (Olson, 1992, p. 516).
Reporters were allowed to travel relatively freely, although not completely without restrictions
(Cassell, 1985, p. 939). Again, the trade-off took the form of censorship. President Roosevelt set
up the United States Office of Censorship, which “instituted a system of voluntary selfcensorship for the press and issued A Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press”
(Boydston, 1992, pp. 1079-1080). While censorship was nominally voluntary, field commanders
had latitude in controlling the flow of news information, and some imposed harsh restrictions
(Jacobs, 1992, p. 682). In addition, the price of accreditation as a correspondent was signing an
agreement to submit all copy for military review (Cassell, 1985, p. 938), as it had been during
World War I.
In Korea, press censorship initially was voluntary (Boydston, 1992, p. 1080). Criticism of the
American command’s performance so outraged General Douglas MacArthur (Olson, 1992, p.

518) that the journalists themselves eventually requested a formal system of censorship (Cassell,
1985, p. 940). To journalists, censorship was a protection from the wrath of MacArthur,
described as “You-write-what-you-like-and-we’ll-shoot-you-if-we-don’t-like-it” (Jacobs, 1992,
p. 683).
The Vietnam War stands alone in American journalistic history in terms of freedom of access,
freedom from review of dispatches, and even logistical support in getting reporters to the
battlefield.
In previous conflicts, censorship was uneven but pervasive. During the Vietnam
War, however, the Pentagon imposed neither censorship by restricted access nor
censorship by prepublication review…Reporters were free to venture almost
anywhere at any time and to write about whatever interested them (Jacobs, 1992,
pp. 683-684).
The price of this unprecedented freedom was merely voluntary adherence to a set of guidelines
regarding military security (Boydston, 1992, p. 1081). Relations between the military command
and the press deteriorated as the press reports became progressively more critical, and “while
war correspondents had traditionally served as instruments of their country, press boosterism
slowly and painfully eroded” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 684). Television reportage was a potent weapon
in the newly adversarial relationship between the press and the military: “graphic war footage
and stories of American atrocities undermined the public’s will to support the war” (Olson, 1992,
p. 519). Despite the controversy connected with this war, the military never instituted any form
of censorship other than voluntary security guidelines, although some actions were conducted in
secrecy, notably the bombing of Laos and Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 (Cassell, 1985, p. 942).
The 1983 action in Grenada marked a different kind of first: reporters were not allowed to
accompany an invasion force. On the third day of the operation, a group of reporters was
escorted around the island for a few hours. Full press access to Grenada did not come until the
sixth day, when the fighting was effectively over (Kenealey, 1992, pp. 316-317; Olson, 1992, pp.
520-521). Journalists railed against these restrictions, yet the public seemed by and large to
support the policy (Cassell, 1985, pp. 944-945).
Press furor took two forms: a lawsuit and editorial complaints. The lawsuit, Flint v.
Weinberger (1984), was dismissed by a federal district court as moot, and the finding upheld on
appeal (Jacobs, 1992, p. 715; Olson, 1992, pp. 525-526). The bitter complaints of the press led
the military to convene a panel to develop policy on wartime press coverage. The Sidle Panel,
named after its chairman, retired Major General Winant Sidle, produced a set of recommendations, including “the largest possible pooling procedure to be in place for the minimum time
possible” and “voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules
established and issued by the military” (Cassell, 1985, p. 946).
The press’ cautious acceptance of the Sidle Panel’s report evaporated with the 1989 operation
in Panama. The press pool was not allowed to accompany the first invasion forces, and once in
Panama was again delayed for military escorts and transportation (Olson, 1992, p. 522). Again,
the action was of short duration, and the serious fighting was over by the rime the press had the
opportunity to visit the battlefield (Boydston, 1992, p. 1083; Smith, J. E., 1993, p. 300).
The Persian Gulf War continued pooling, military escorts, and review of the dispatches (*5).
The major objections of the press concerned restricted access in the form of pooling, delays in
the transmission of stories for copy review, and military escorts’ interference in reporters’

interviews with the troops (Dennis, Stebenne, Paulik, Thalhimer, LaMay, Smillie, FitzSimon,
Gazsi, & Rachlin, 1991, p. 19), although some journalists working outside the press pools
claimed they were harassed by members of the armed forces (Committee to Protect Journalists,
1992, pp. 167-169). Censorship per se, however, was minimal. Few stories were altered as a
result of military review (Dennis et al., 1991, pp. 26-30), and the guidelines provided that the
news organizations, not the military, would make the final determination in the event of a dispute
(Nation Magazine, 1991, pp. 1577-1578) (*6).
Last-minute diplomatic initiatives were able to avert war in Haiti in the fall of 1994, but the
Department of Defense had prepared for a full-scale military invasion. Press guidelines were
similar to those in the Persian Gulf War, and again included provisions for military escorts,
review of reporters’ copy for violations of the security ground rules, and a requirement that
reporters obtain accreditation before being allowed access to the front (U.S. Department of
Defense, 1994a) (*7). The media ground rules were also similar to those issued during the Gulf
War, and in addition to detailing specific kinds of information that could not be reported without
jeopardizing the correspondent’s accreditation, left open the options of restricted access and
press pools (U.S. Department of Defense, 1994b)(*8).
Military Operations and the Globe Newspaper Test
Is There a Tradition of Openness?
That criminal trials have historically been open is clear. Battlefields and military bases,
however, are not presumptively open to the public as are trials and public fora. While control
over making war and funding military forces is firmly in civilian hands, a power tracing back to
Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, in fact there is not a tradition of
complete public access to areas in which the military operates, nor complete public access to
information in possession of the military. If the Globe test is taken literally, “there is no tradition
of public openness” with regard to military operations (Cassell, 1985, p. 959).
While the general public has not enjoyed access to the battlefront since the early engagements
of the Civil War, an argument can be made that the press acts as a surrogate for the public in its
scrutiny of government activities. Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe (1974) makes such an
argument.
In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at
large…By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political
process, the press perfoms a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose
of the First Amendment (p. 863).
Thus, situations historically open to the press might be construed as, in effect, open to the
public. Accredited correspondents have long had some kind of access to war. If not to the public
itself, is there a tradition of openness to the press? Press complaints about the Pentagon’s
restrictions in the Gulf War were long, loud, and often adversarial (e.g., Browne, 1991; Cronkite,
1991; Kurtz, 1991;
________________________
Rykken, 1991; Schanberg, 1991). Review of the historical context of American press coverage of
warfare, however, suggests that the Gulf War restrictions were neither extraordinary nor

unusually restrictive by comparison to the heavy-handed controls frequently in place prior to the
Vietnam War; in fact, “wartime regulation of the press is hardly a recent development” Jacobs,
1992, p. 677). While some writers decry the pool coverage begun in the Grenada action as an
unconstitutional encroachment on the press freedom benchmarked by Vietnam (e.g., Smith, J. E.,
1993) it is historically more accurate to see Vietnam as the exception rather than the rule (Jacobs,
1992, pp. 683-684).
The pool coverage system used in the Persian Gulf, Grenada, and Panama is not simply a
regression of a historical trend of ever-freer press coverage of combat. There are two distinct
trends moving in opposing directions: access to the front has become more restrictive, as
interference with news copy has become less restrictive. Some would rather the press gain
greater access at the expense of censorship (Cronkite, 1991); others fear that demands for greater
access may bring exactly that trade-off (Cassell, 1985; Jacobs, 1992). Regardless of how one
might fell about the desirability of the situation, in fact “the press has been able to view wartime
operations only at the sufferance of the military” (Cassell, 1985, p. 959, footnote 210), and courts
have rightly been reluctant to second-guess “when the cost of judicial error is so high” (Jacobs,
1992, p. 703).
The complaints of some journalists that the military was unwilling to accredit a sufficient
number of correspondents to properly cover the war are simply not warranted; there were more
correspondents in the field during the Gulf War than in Vietnam.
In the end, an average of 165 reporters and support personnel were put into
U.S. units in fourteen pools and allowed to cover the [Gulf] war. By comparison,
of the 461 reporters with the Eisenhower HQ in England, only twenty-seven
eventually went with U.S. forces on D-Day. By the media’s own estimates, there
were never more than seventy-five reporters out ‘in the bush’ under fire at any one
time in Vietnam (Sherman, 1992, p. 647).
Nor is it credible to suggest, for instance, that coverage of World War II was open objective
(see Fussell, 1989), while the Persian Gulf coverage was made-to-order government propaganda
(see Parenti, 1993, pp. 163-171). In military operations other than Vietnam, the press enjoyed
access only at the cost of censorship of its copy, which is no longer a legally or socially palatable
tradeoff.
Is Press Access Significant to the Process?
It is hard to argue that public scrutiny helps the military in the conduct of war; on the
contrary, secrecy is of prime operational importance (Ciausewitz, 1832/1’993, pp. 233-234). One
of the few exceptions the Supreme Court has recognized to the First Amendment right of free
speech concerns matters of national security during wartime.
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right (Near v. Minnesota. 1931, p. 716).

The communication technology used in contemporary journalism is radically different from
that used in earlier wars (Sherman, 1992, pp. 636-637), chiefly in the speed with which field
reports are processed and disseminated (*9). The heightened security concerns of the military are
well founded: real-time news broadcasts eliminate any possibility of security review of the
material before it becomes public. Technology changes have been significant not only in the
news process, but in the conduct of warfare. Smart bombs and stealth fighters illustrate the
strategic importance of information to modern warfare. The more technology dependent warfare
becomes, the more critical is the control of technical information and the more difficult the task
of controlling it (Smolla, 1992, p. 304).
Now that global television coverage is commonplace, news broadcasts can easily serve as
intelligence for the enemy: “even the most careless newspaper reporter has her work scanned by
editors, while the remarks of a television reporter broadcasting live go unchecked, straight from
her mouth to Saddam Hussein’s ears” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 709). In World War II, a serious breach
of the security guidelines occurred when a reporter revealed that the Allies had been able to
crack the Japanese naval code (Jacobs, 1992, p. 682). No apparent harm came of the article,
which was published in the Chicago Tribune, but the potential damage of a comparable television story today is clearly much greater. In the Gulf War, a story on how the Air Force located
and destroyed Iraqi tanks was subsequently judged by the military to have breached security
guidelines, and the information may well have been useful to the Iraqi forces (Dennis et al.,
1991, p. 20). More recently, a television news executive, explaining CNN’s decision to delay
reporting on military planes taking off for Haiti, acknowledged the unique ability of live
television coverage to compromise a military operation: “Unlike the print process, our work is
instantly available to global eyes: friend, foe, neutral alike” (Turner, 1994).
Such a dramatic increase in the speed of transporting some material (in this case, information
about warfare) is likely to produce a crisis in the control of that material (Beniger, 1986). The
speed and geographical coverage of satellite communications have effectively rendered the
traditional security controls over reporters’ copy obsolete, chiefly by eliminating opportunities to
review the copy before broadcast. With little or no time remaining between the origination of the
pictures and reception by worldwide viewers, the military’s access restrictions can fairly be seen
as the attempt to rebuild a control mechanism capable of satisfying its legitimate need for
secrecy.
Beyond the strategic concerns of the military is the larger context: the role of public information in policy formation and implementation. While war needs to be waged in relative secrecy,
our form of government requires policy to be formed in relative openness. The dilemma is that
while “[s]peech concerning national security is unique in its potential for catastrophe…[s]ecrecy
is the antithesis of free speech and an anathema to an open democracy” (Smolla, 1992, p. 303).
In the late twentieth century the prevailing image of the press is that of watchdog: the press
provides the checking force on the three branches of Federal government (Stewart, 1982;
Boydston, 1992, p. 1096), guarding against possible abuses of power. This is essentially a reformist role (Gans, 1980, pp. 68-69); the value of the press to the public is that it draws attention
to undesirable governmental policies or actions and stimulates change. The tie between the press
and various reform movements is a long-standing tradition, elating back to the middle 1800’s
(Dicken-Garcia, 1989, pp. 40-41). While the press can exert influence on public discourse in
various ways, including agenda-setting and issue framing (Iyengar & Simon, 1993), the essence
of the press’ challenge to the power structure is its demand for self-reform. The news industry’s
protests about the Gulf War restrictions are good examples of such calls for change (* 10).

A source of frustration to the press, in fact, is the public’s acceptance of the restrictions
(Dennis et al., 1991, p. 82 ff.). Far from seeing the constraints on information flow as a violation
of either their right to know or their vital interest in monitoring the government’s actions, ordinary citizens for the most part reacted favorably (*11). While the press may have seen a righteous
conflict between itself and the military (e.g., Browne, 1991), the public clearly wanted the press
to play on the military’s team.
The military’s aversion to microscopic scrutiny by the press has at least some basis in the way
the press chooses to cover war, and in the recognition that the commercial environment of the
news media can drive the coverage toward “a sensationalized focus on emotional issues…in a
desperate search for high ratings” (Sherman, 1992, p. 638). Battlefield reports can easily
exaggerate the importance of a single event or viewpoint at the expense of the deeper policy
issues (*12). Journalists may not completely understand military situations, yet their commentary
can carry a weight disproportionate to their expertise. One military expert noted that in the Gulf
War coverage “ [a] gross mistake repeated over and over tended to gain a level of legitimacy”
(Smith, P.M., 1991, p. 131).
The government’s concern about the effect of press coverage on the home front is longstanding, and realistic. The carnage of warfare is something the American public has not confronted
directly since the Civil War; American soil has never been the target of aerial bombing, a painful
memory in other parts of the world. On the whole, war reportage has spared the public the very
most grotesque images of war (See Fussell, 1989, for rather unvarnished descriptions of the
anatomical remains of battle.)
Faced with graphic evidence of the horror of war, the public may lose the will to wage it
(Olson, 1992, p. 519), even though they might agree the situation required such use of brutal
force. It is plausible that military operations in the Gulf War might have continued into Iraq (and
many now argue that they should have) had the scenes of carnage on the highway out of Kuwait
City not come to national attention so dramatically. The images of the air war in the Persian
Gulf, on the other hand, seemed cleaner and thus easier to accept, perhaps fulfilling a hope that
“the war could be won by shrewd Yankee technological expedients, like, for example, bombing
from costly airplanes flying at safe altitudes” (as Fussell, 1989, p. 13 comments about World
War II).
While it is a tribute to our humanity that we abhor the brutality to which war coverage bears
testimony, that emotion may not always be the wisest basis on which to debate waging war, or to
decide military strategy once combat has begun.
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to
disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this
is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must
be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come
from kindness are the very worst (Ciausewitz, 1832/1993, pp. 83-84).
If the primary reason for a free press is “its function of providing information to the public so
that the citizenry may adequately govern” (Kenealey, 1992, p. 320) the information being provided must be appropriate to that governance. Even if the press has unimpeded access to the
front, the public is still not guaranteed that it will obtain information useful for reasoned
consideration of policy.

Broadly speaking, disputes over the use of American troops often will center
not on precisely what the troops were doing or what t11e conditions surrounding
their involvement were, but rather on the propriety of using force as an
instrument of national policy. In such disputes, press access to the battlefield
is simply irrelevant (Cassell, 1985, p. 968).
It is interesting to note the arenas in which various interested parties chose to contest the issue
of the Gulf War restrictions. The progressive news organizations, Congressmen, and academics
chose the courts, via the Nation suit, as the venue in which to advance their interests. Because
they have comparatively less clout in the media marketplace, the institutional level was the best
choice for these stakeholders. On the other hand, the mainstream press and the military engaged
in the arena of public discourse, via op-ed broadsides on the one hand and public relations
strategies on the other. Since public support is “capital” vital to both these heavyweights, we
might think of this as a struggle for positional advantage in the marketplace of ideas. Through
the lens of an economist, the argument over the Gulf War press restrictions would appear as a
negotiation of transaction costs for the interested parties (see Pejovich, 1990, pp. 38-41 for
discussion of transaction costs).
Whether in support of a war or in opposition to it, press coverage is at best imperfect
information serving an imperfect discourse on matters of utmost importance. If war is best
waged in secrecy, and public decisions best made with full knowledge, then military operations
exist in a state of tension between those two imperatives. In an open democracy such as America,
public opinion about a military operation is of crucial significance to the operation’s success.
Changes in communication technology have forced us to reconsider the balance between
the need to hide and the need to know.
Is There a Compelling Government Interest?
Were the Restrictions Narrowly Drawn?
The press, for its part, has been adamant in framing the press restrictions as a government
power play in an adversarial relationship between itself and the military (for example, Cronkite,
1991; Denniston, 1991; Kurtz, 1991; Rykken, 1991; Schanberg, 1991; Sloyan, 1992), an animosity it says dates back to Vietnam. One journalist comments, “I cannot entirely dismiss from my
mind the anti-press cant that has pervaded American military journals and pronouncements
ever since the Vietnam War” (Browne, 1991, p. 30). Another is more direct: “The military is
acting on a generally discredited Pentagon myth that the Vietnam War was lost because of the
uncensored press coverage’’ (Cronkite, 1991). While the military has repeatedly justified the
restrictions on grounds of operational security and protection for the reporters themselves (for
example, Gersh, 1991; “Pete Williams Debriefs,” 1991; “Press, Politicians Weigh Coverage,”
1991), many journalists simply do not accept that explanation. The Gulf War restrictions were, in
their view, a thinly disguised public relations strategy to keep the home front supportive of the
war effort.
So it’s all too clear that the current restrictions have noti1ing to do with military
security and everything to do with political security. Political security requires
that the government do as complete a job as possible at blacking out stories that
might lead to embarrassment or criticism of the government or to questions
from ordinary Americans about t11e war policy (Schanberg, 1991, pp. 24-25).

Even if the press’ deconstruction of the military’s pool system is true, and the real intent of
the restrictions was to muzzle the kind of critical reportage which fueled public discontent with
the Vietnam War, the operational security concerns raised by instantaneous electronic communications still remain.
The problem with the pool system is that it became a convenient tool to reward
and punish reporters for the stories they wrote, and to keep journalists from
learning embarrassing or unfavorable information. However…the existence
of an illegitimate purpose does not negate a legitimate purpose (Jacobs, 1992,
p. 722).
It is likely that the press guidelines issued for the Haiti operation in the fall of 1994 would
have sparked similar complaints had actual combat broken out. While news executives were
pleased that they were able to deploy equipment and correspondents on Haiti in advance of an
expected U.S. invasion force (Carter, 1994a), some journalists nonetheless denounced the press
guidelines as too similar to those of the Gulf War (“Military Censorship Lives,” 1994). It is
worth noting, however, that the television networks agreed to a White House request to delay
reports that planes carrying paratroopers were en route to Haiti, and cited concern for the success
of the operation as the reason (Carter, 1994b).
While some in the press might be willing to volunteer for censorship of television and print
reports in exchange for freer access (Cronkite, 1991), the doctrine of press freedom defined by
the Pentagon Papers case bars such clear-cut prior restraint. In the final analysis, access restrictions may be the only way to guarantee protection of national security interests when technology
has reduced transmission times to nearly zero.
And the Bottom Line Is…
This paper cannot resolve whether there ought to be such a thing as war. History tells us there
is, and current events suggest there will be. Since Vietnam the public has a clearer picture of the
horrors of war; our struggles over the depiction of war have a direct outcome in our ability to
successfully conduct war. The press’ interest in showing war in its raw and uncut form is a
legitimate interest, as is the military’s interest in controlling information. In modern televised
warfare, information is armament, not just in the technical and strategic realms but in the effect
news stories can have on policy formation.
However deeply the press may feel it is entitled to legal protection from the military’s
controls, warfare is exempted by the Globe Newspaper test. The access restrictions in place
during the Persian Gulf War, and those prepared for a possible war in Haiti, were constitutional.
That press access to the battlefield is socially desirable is at least arguable. That such access is
a right guaranteed by the First Amendment is contrary to constitutional law. If the press is to win
greater freedom in covering war, it will likely fare better in the marketplace of public opinion
than in the courts.
Notes
(*l) While no mainstream news organization chose to challenge the press restrictions in court,
the list of plaintiffs in Nation Magazine is a who’s who of the American progressive journalism

world. Joined in this suit are Nation, Harper’s, In These Times, Pacific News Service, The
Guardian, The Progressive. Mother Jones, The L.A. Weekly, The Village Voice, The Texas
Observer, Pacifica Radio News. Sydney H. Schanberg, E. L. Doctorow, William Styron. Michael
Klare, and Scott Armstrong, plus a separate lawsuit filed by Agence France-Presse. The list of
interested parties with amicus curiae briefs included thirteen members of Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, and academics Ben Bagdikian,
Todd Gitlin, and Herbert L Schiller, among others. The defendants included Secretary of
Defense Richard Cheney, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Peter Williams,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and President of the United States
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces George Bush. While the mainstream press did not
join in this suit (see Parenti, 1993, p. 167 for criticism on this Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept. of
Defense nonetheless was fraught with the possibility of kind of defeat for the military.
(*2) Injunctive relief halts an activity in progress. Declarative relief prohibits the action in the
future.
(*3) The delicate balancing of the public’s right to know and the legitimate need to keep certain
information confidential is evident in Justice Brennan’s concurrence:
[T]he First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access
to information…Yet the Court has not ruled out a public access component
to the First Amendment in every circumstance…[A]ny privilege of access
to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the
nature of the information and countervailing interests in security and
confidentiality (Richmond Newspapers, 1980, p. 585-586).
(*4) Quotation is from an agreement signed by accredited correspondents, cited in Boydston,
1992, p. 1078, footnote 58.
(*5) Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. American forces were deployed on August
8, followed by the press pool on August 12. On August 26 the pool was abolished and access
allowed to all accredited journalists. In advance of the hostilities, the Department of Defense
renewed pooling on January 7, 1991 and added review of stories and military escorts to the
requirements. The air war began on January 16, and the ground offensive on February 24. Pool
coverage of the ground warfare was blacked out for forty-eight hours at the start of the ground
campaign; dispatches from correspondents accompanying the ground forces were delayed.
Hostilities ceased on February 27, and all press restrictions ended on March 4. (See Olson, 1992,
pp. 512-513).
The Nation suit was filed on January 10, 1991, prior to the start of the air war, and decided on
April 16, 1991, after the restrictions had been lifted.
(*6) The full texts of the ground rules, media guidelines, and operating policies of the press pools
appear in the appendices of Nation Magazine, 1991, pp. 1575-1582.
(*7) Note the following passages from the Defense Department’s “Guidelines for News Media,”

issued September 16, 1994:
Media representatives are asked to assist the operation by blacking out network
broadcasts from launch points prior to the landing of forces in the area of operation….
Do not approach military personnel, especially during hours of darkness, without
express military approval….News media representatives who are not accredited
with the Joint Task Force Joint Information Bureau (JTB) will not be permitted
into forward areas….Security at the source will be the primary and desired means
of protecting the operations security of the mission and enforcing the media ground
rules.
(*8) Note the following passage from the Defense Department’s “Haiti Operation Media Ground
Rules,” issued September 16, 1994:
…the media will be provided timely access to t11e operation, subject to operations
security and legal consideration. However, situations may arise in which movement
of news media representatives will be restricted or in which a media pool is necessary.
(*9) A survey of news executives listed ten new communication technologies the press used in
the Gulf War: electronic mail and computer-to-computer communications; digital transmission
of still photographs; facsimile transmission; portable satellite telephones; remotely sensed
satellite imagery; frame capture of video images to print; laptop computers; international data
transmission networks; flyaway satellite uplinks; and computer graphics (Dennis et al., 1991, p.
35). All of these technological changes increase the speed of newsgathering and reporting, which
stresses or bypasses the traditional security mechanisms.
(*10) Not everyone is satisfied with a moderate role for the press. Some critics have charged that
despite its assertions to the contrary the mainstream press acts nor as a watchdog but as a mouthpiece for government interests (e.g., Parenti, 1993; Solomon, 1992), particularly when military
operations are concerned. Nonetheless, it is hard to discount the stridency of the mainstream
press’ protests about the Gulf War restrictions simply because the protests operated within the
“system.”
(*11) Even while aware that the government had withheld information about the war from them,
57% answered “give military more control” to a January 1991 Times Mirror poll question
whether the government or the press should exert more control over the Gulf War reporting. In
the same survey, another item asking “do you think the United States military is hiding bad news
(about the Gulf) from the public or do you think it is telling the public as much as it can under
the circumstances?” generated a 78% response of “telling as much as it can” (Milavsky, 1991, p.
32). If the wartime polls on news coverage constitute something of a referendum on the press
restrictions, there is ample reason to believe a majority of Americans “feel that censorship for
national security is more important than the media’s ability to report the news the way it wants to
report it” (Lichter, 1991, p. 2).
That the public entrusted the government with a higher degree of control over information
during the Gulf War than it would tolerate in peacetime is not unprecedented. A poll taken
during World War II showed 55% of the respondents supported “having official government

spokesmen write the war news for the papers and broadcast it over me radio” (Milavsky, 1991, p.
32).
(*12) The dramatic change in U.S. policy goals in Somalia following the publication of pictures
of mistreated American casualties is illustrative of the potency of news coverage in public
dialogue about war (see, for instance, Gordon & Friedman, 1993). This relationship between me
press and government policy is not unique to the United States, but a characteristic of a political
system which allows a free press in an age of electronic communications (e.g., Erlanger, 1994 on
the impact of the newly-free Russian press on government efforts to suppress a rebellion in
Chechnya).
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